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Available online 21 January 2012Complex, but specific, tasks—such as chess or Jeopardy!—are popularly seen as milestones for
artificial intelligence (AI). However, they are not appropriate for evaluating the intelligence
of machines or measuring the progress in AI. Aware of this delusion, Detterman has recently
raised a challenge prompting AI researchers to evaluate their artefacts against IQ tests. We
agree that the philosophy behind (human) IQ tests is a much better approach to machine in-
telligence evaluation than these specific tasks, and also more practical and informative than
the Turing test. However, we have first to recall some work on machine intelligence measure-
ment which has shown that some IQ tests can be passed by relatively simple programs. This
suggests that the challenge may not be so demanding and may just work as a sophisticated
CAPTCHA, since some types of tests might be easier than others for the current state of AI. Sec-
ond, we show that an alternative, formal derivation of intelligence tests for machines is possi-
ble, grounded in (algorithmic) information theory. In these tests, we have a proper
mathematical definition of what is being measured. Third, we re-visit some research done in
the past fifteen years for effectively measuring machine intelligence—since some assumptions
about the subjects and their distribution no longer hold.
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CAPTCHA1. Introduction: The challenge
In February 2011, Douglas K. Detterman announced a
challenge (originally to IBM's program Watson (Ferrucci et
al., 2010), the recent winner of the Jeopardy! TV quiz show
at the time) for the whole field of artificial intelligence (AI).
AI artefacts should be better measured by classical IQ tests.
The challenge goes as follows (Detterman, 2011): “I, the edi-
torial board of Intelligence, and members of the International
Society for Intelligence Research will develop a unique bat-
tery of intelligence tests that would be administered to that
computer and would result in an actual IQ score”.
Computers are (still) so stupid today, that it seems clear
that an average result at IQ tests is far beyond currentnica de València, Camí
007x73585; fax: +34
u.au (D.L. Dowe),
ll rights reserved.computer technology. “It is doubtful that anyone will take
up this challenge in the near future”, Detterman said
(Detterman, 2011). But the challenge had already been
taken up, in the past.
In 2003, a computer programperformed quite well on stan-
dard human IQ tests (Sanghi & Dowe, 2003). This was an ele-
mentary program, far smaller than Watson or the successful
chess-playing Deep Blue (Campbell, Hoane, & Hsu, 2002). The
program had only about 960 lines of code in the programming
language Perl (accompanied by a list of 25,143 words), but it
even surpassed the average score (of 100) on some tests
(Sanghi & Dowe, 2003, Table 1).
The computer program underlying this work was based
on the realisation that most IQ test questions that the authors
had seen until then tended to be of one of a small number
of types or formats. Formats such as “insert missing letter/
number in middle or at end” and “insert suffix/prefix to
complete two or more words”were included in the program.
Other formats such as “completematrix of numbers/characters”,
“use directions, comparisons and/or pictures”, “find the odd
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although they are discussed in Sanghi and Dowe (2003)
along with their potential implementation. The IQ score
given to the program for such questions not included in the
computer programwas the expected average from a random
guess, although clearly the program would obtain a better
“IQ” if efforts were made to implement any, some or all of
these other formats.
So, apart from random guesses, the program obtains its
score from being quite reliable at questions of the “insert
missing letter/number in middle or at end” and “insert
suffix/prefix to complete two or more words” natures. For
the latter “insert suffix/prefix” sort of question, it must be
confessed that the program was assisted by a look-up list of
25,143 words. Substantial parts of the program are spent on
the former sort of question “insert missing letter/number in
middle or at end”, with software to examine for arithmetic
progressions (e.g., 7 10 13 16 ?), geometric progressions
(e.g., 3 6 12 24 ?), arithmetic geometric progressions (e.g., 3
5 9 17 33 ?), squares, cubes, Fibonacci sequences (e.g., 0 1 1
2 3 5 8 13 ?) and even arithmetic-Fibonacci hybrids such as
(0 1 3 6 11 19 ?). Much of the program is spent on parsing
input and formatting output strings—and some of the pro-
gram is internal redundant documentation and blank lines
for ease of programmer readability.
We can, of course, argue whether this experiment com-
plies with the challenge. Detterman established two levels
for the challenge, while only computers passing the second
level “could be said to be truly intelligent” (Detterman,
2011). Perhaps this program is only acceptable for the first
level of the challenge (where the type of IQ tests is seen in
advance by the programmer). However, it is important to
note that this toy program was capable of passing tests it
had not seen beforehand (which is closer to the second and
ultimate level of the challenge). If not directly qualified, the
Perl program could at least form an initial benchmark in
this challenge.
Of course, the system can be improved in many ways. It
was just a 3rd year undergraduate student project, a quarter
of a semester's work. With the budget Deep Blue or Watson
had, the program would likely excel in a very wide range of
IQ tests. But this is not the point. The purpose of the experiment
was not to show that the program was intelligent. Rather, the
intention was showing that conventional IQ tests are not for
machines—a point that the relative success of this simple pro-
gram would seem to make emphatically. This is natural, how-
ever, since IQ tests have been specialised and refined for well
over a century to work well for humans.
We are certain that the editorial board of Intelligence and
some members of the International Society for Intelligence
Research can figure out a diverse battery of tests that the
average human can pass and the Perl program would fail.
(We could probably do this, too.) But an improved version
of the program would surely make things more difficult for
the board. This spiral is precisely what CAPTCHAs do (von
Ahn, Blum, & Langford, 2004). The definition of a CAPTCHA
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers
and Humans Apart) is basically any problem an average
human can pass easily but current computer technology can-
not. We are using them everyday on the Internet—e.g., to cre-
ate a new account or post a comment—, frequently shown asa sequence of deformed letters. They are useful and revealing,
but they cannot be considered an intelligence test. They are
testing humanity—or perhaps rather little more than the abil-
ity to recognise deformed Roman-language letters (and then
type the matching letters on the console keyboard). In addi-
tion, when bots get equipped with tools able to crack them,
the CAPTCHAs have to be replaced by more sophisticated
ones. As a result, some (brilliant) people struggle with them.
Summing up, there are IQ tests no machine can pass now-
adays, but a selection of the ‘machine-unfriendly’ IQ tests
would have no particular relation with their ability to mea-
sure intelligence well in humans, but rather just their ability
to discriminate between humans and state-of-the-art ma-
chines, as CAPTCHAs do. This selection (or battery) of IQ
tests would need to be changed and made more elaborate
year after year as AI technology advances.
2. Measuring machine intelligence
So, what are the right intelligence tests for machines? The
Turing test (originally just conceived as an imitation game)
(Oppy & Dowe, 2011; Turing, 1950) has been the answer to
many philosophical questions about thinking machines, but
it is not an intelligence test in that it is not able to evaluate
machines and humans on the same scale (or even on differ-
ent scales). In the end, the Turing test is also a test of human-
ity, rather than intelligence. Also, it can be argued that the
Turing test has set the goal of AI on a philosophical, misguided
dimension. However, all said, in our opinion, the Turing test has
had a limited impact on how the discipline of AI has evolved
over the years.
The problemwith AI cannot be found in a wrong interpre-
tation of the notion of intelligence. In fact, the very discipline
of AI adheres to the mainstream concept of intelligence as,
e.g., “a very general mental capability that, among other
things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems,
think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly
and learn from experience” (Gottfredson, 1997). All these
mentioned abilities are mirrored in subdisciplines of AI,
such as automated reasoning, planning, problem solving,
knowledge representation, natural language processing, ma-
chine learning, etc. However, the advances in developing
evaluation devices for all these subdisciplines, and across
subdisciplines, have not been particularly encouraging. In
more than fifty years of history of AI, only a few ad-hoc, scat-
tered and specific testing mechanisms have been developed
in each of these subdisciplines. This is one of the problems,
if not the most important one, in AI—the lack of proper mea-
suring devices to evaluate its progress.
Some early works in the 1990s looked for better alterna-
tives. Dowe and Hajek (1997, 1998) presented an enriched
Turing test with compression exercises, which, in the end,
aim at measuring the ability of inductive inference à la
MML (Wallace & Boulton, 1968). The Minimum Message
Length (MML) principle advocates for (two-part) compres-
sion as a way to perform inductive inference (or induction—
i.e., learning) and, ultimately, intelligence (Dowe, 2011,
sec. 7.3).
Similarly, Hernández-Orallo (2000a); Hernández-Orallo
and Minaya-Collado (1998) devised a new test—known as
the C-test—with sequence-completion exercises very similar
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were created from computational principles, and its com-
plexity (k, basically the number of instructions of the shortest
program generating the sequence) was mathematically
quantified using constructs derived from Kolmogorov com-
plexity—a theory closely related to MML (Wallace & Dowe,
1999). The C-test was built by including exercises whose
complexity range was k=7..14, an interval that was deemed
appropriate for humans since items with kb7 looked trivial,
while items with k>14 were really challenging (to us).
With the limitations of an amateur experimentation pro-
cedure, the test was administered to humans, and the re-
sults strongly correlated (certainly as many other difficult
tasks do) with the results of some IQ tests which were
also administered to the same subjects (Hernández-
Orallo & Minaya-Collado, 1998, Appendix A). For the au-
thors, intelligence was no longer (only) what the IQ
tests measure, but (also) a precise mathematical concept.
The new pathway looked so promising that even
mathematically-derived ‘factorisations’ of intelligence
were suggested (Hernández-Orallo, 2000b).
But once that ‘stupid’ Perl program (Sanghi & Dowe,
2003) was able to pass some IQ tests, the idyllic picture
blurred. It must be said that the idea of connecting the exer-
cises found in many IQ tests with the mathematical theory of
inductive inference based on (algorithmic) information theo-
ry was not affected by the experiment with the Perl program.
However, the research plan was hit by a fatal torpedo, since
this new battery of mathematically-devised C-tests looked
fairly easy to crack. In fact, the toy Perl program managed
to solve some problems of high k complexity and, overall,
can score slightly better than humans on the C-tests.
The previous quest for alternative approaches to intelli-
gence measurement and our dismissal of conventional IQ
tests for machine evaluation should not be misunderstood.
There must be few people in the area of AI who have advocat-
ed more than us for the hybridisation of psychometrics, com-
parative cognition and machine intelligence measurement.
But, in our opinion, the experiment with this small program
in Perl has already shown that IQ tests have become specia-
lised for humans, and many difficulties may arise if these
tests are used to measure intelligence outside this ‘norma-
tive’ population. This is easier to accept from the point of
view of comparative (animal) cognition since human IQ
tests are not commonly used for evaluating animals. Since
2003, this conviction is also shaping up in AI: human IQ
tests are not for machines. The reason is that, in our opinion,
many things are taken for granted in IQ tests which cannot be
assumed for machines. Current IQ tests are anthropocentric.
Some important elements of intelligence which are shared
by almost all humans are not evaluated by regular IQ tests.
We can see some of these elements in ‘non-regular’ tests
which are designed for people with intellectual disabilities
or mental retardation, for children or for non-human ani-
mals. But even these kinds of tests (including the C-tests) as-
sume many things about the subject.
3. Intelligence tests for machines must be universal
If we really want to measure intelligence instead of hu-
manity and fully understand what we are really measuring,the Turing test is clearly not an option—and neither is a di-
verse battery of specific tasks such as (e.g.) chess, Jeopardy
or multiplying large numbers together, even though these
tasks were once (considered) the exclusive domain of “intel-
ligent” humans. We do believe that some human IQ tests are
much better than any other test that has been developed so
far in AI, so we agree with Detterman insofar as “there is a
better alternative: test computers on human intelligence
tests” (Detterman, 2011). But the above-mentioned works
(Dowe & Hajek, 1997, 1998; Hernández-Orallo, 2000a;
Sanghi & Dowe, 2003) seem to bring some evidence that
this alternative cannot be the definitive answer. Regular IQ
tests cannot be the guide for AI. This was, in fact, one of the
first tracks that the then young discipline of AI explored in
the 1960s. IQ tests were used as inspiration for constructing
intelligent systems (Evans, 1964), but this line of research
stalled and has had no significant progress since that date,
despite several subsequent attempts by other authors. More
recently, for example, the idea of using IQ tests as a bench-
mark to drive the discipline of AI has been made explicit in
Bringsjord and Schimanski (2003). However, their impact
has been very limited since only AI systems which are specia-
lised to the particular test interface and choice of symbolic
representation can be evaluated.
We think there is one main reason for this apparent dead
end. The measurement of intelligence for machines must be
more holistic, since it cannot take anything for granted. We
can assume even fewer things than in animal intelligence
evaluation. The solution must be found then in the universal-
ity of the concept of intelligence. This means that if a single
test is not able to measure the intelligence (or other cognitive
abilities) of non-human animals and humans precisely, it is
very difficult to expect that this test will measure machine in-
telligence accurately. This leads to the notion of universal test,
a test which must be valid for humans, non-human animals,
machines, hybrids and collectives, of any degree of intelli-
gence. This does not mean, of course, that these universal
tests should replace IQ tests for evaluating humans. There
are many possible instruments, or vehicles (Jensen, 1998,
chap. 10), to measure the same construct or ability, and we
should use the best instrument according to the construct
and the kind of subject. For intelligence and humans, IQ
tests seem to be a very good instrument, as we could also
use brain monitoring and neuro-imaging techniques, or any
other kind of physical or genetic traits. For some animals,
very specialised and sophisticated instruments have been de-
veloped, as well. For some machines we could also use custo-
mised tests for a particular ‘series’ or ‘architecture’, or we
could even inspect their programs. We clearly do not need
to use the same test for all of them, with the proviso that we
are given information about the kind of subject we are evalu-
ating. However, for any unknown machine for which we do
not have any information whatsoever, tests must be
universal.
The crucial point for understanding why universality is so
significant is the realisation that machines are a much more
heterogeneous set of subjects. The only constraints for a ma-
chine are computational resources and the aptitudes of its
programmers. Any imaginable (computable) behaviour is
possible. It could behave as a human, it could behave as a
rat or it could behave as something we have never seen
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tions, or species. The mere notion of an ‘average’ machine is
ridiculous, because there is no normative population of ma-
chines. Only if we are given some information about the ex-
aminee, can we use more efficient, customised tests, as we
do with human IQ tests. But if we are not given any informa-
tion at all about the subject, our measuring ruler must be as
universal as possible, at the risk of losing precision or effi-
ciency. This follows a natural principle of measurement:
measuring is less efficient and more difficult the less we
know about the subject.
The lack of normative populations also makes some well-
established psychometric techniques infeasible. We cannot
derive the difficulty of an item by howwellmachines perform
on it unless we find a reasonable choice for the machine pop-
ulation. In fact, we can program machines which fail at the
easy items while acing at the difficult ones. This means that
test items have to be very carefully designed in such a way
that we need to knowwhat they represent and what their in-
trinsic difficulty is.
This limits the applicability of some powerful tools such as
Spearman's theorem on the indifference of the indicator
(Spearman, 1927), which states that any kind of test, any
measurement instrument, is perfectly useful for measuring
intelligence provided that it correlates with the ‘g factor’.
With machines, it is not clear how the ‘g loading’ (correlation
between a test and g) can be derived, since correlations re-
quire a population. In fact, it is not clear at all whether a g fac-
tor exists for machines.
Of course we can calculate the g loading and the item dif-
ficulty for humans, i.e. normed on a human subject sample,
and extrapolate to other kinds of individuals. Those tests
with lower g loading can be considered more specific. There-
fore, specialised, non-intelligent machines are expected to
eventually be able to solve these tasks. Apart from being an-
thropocentric, this rationale does not seem to work. It is true
that many tasks machines perform well at nowadays have
relatively low g loading in humans (e.g. arithmetic). Howev-
er, there are some other cognitive tests at which machines
can perform well but which have very high g loading in
humans, such as inductive inference tasks (e.g. series com-
pletion, such as the C-tests). Conversely, CAPTCHAs typically
use tasks with presumably very low g loading to tell humans
and computers apart, such as reading distorted text. In fact,
these tasks can be performed by humans without thinking.
All this does not necessarily entail that the ‘g construct’ may
not work for machines, but just the well-known fact that fac-
tor correlations and loadings cannot be extrapolated between
dissimilar distributions—here, humans and machines.
One could (even) go so far as to imagine an elaborate
model of hierarchical clusters of models with single (and
even multiple) latent factors, as per the statistical theory in
(e.g.) (Edwards & Dowe, 1998; Wallace, 1995; Wallace &
Freeman, 1992) (Wallace, 2005, sec. 6.9) (Dowe, 2008, sec.
0.2.4, p537, col. 2) and possibly also as per Jensen (1998),
chap. 10, p337, Fig. 10.3, but even this would still leave our
models and their resultant latent factors dependent upon
the underlying population being modelled—and it is not
only unclear how best to sample from the machine popula-
tion, but computing history shows that this population
(whatever it is) seems to be changing quite rapidly. Thismay (all) suggest that the g loading of a cognitive test should
be determined theoretically and not empirically.
A convenient theoretical, a priori approach to construct-
ing intelligence tests can be based on formal computational
definition of the cognitive abilities involved, and likewise a
mathematical, intrinsic, derivation of task complexity. For ex-
ample, the theory of inductive inference based on (algorith-
mic) information theory (Wallace & Boulton, 1968; Wallace
& Dowe, 1999) models inductive inference ability, closely re-
lated to Solomonoff's earlier notions of algorithmic probabi-
listic prediction (Solomonoff, 1964). This allows for the
a priori generation of exercises of different complexity,
where this complexity is derived in a mathematical way
(Hernández-Orallo, 2000a,b) and not obtained in an empiri-
cal way over a population. Determining the complexity of
tasks in this way would then be much more informative for
AI (and also for the research on human and non-human ani-
mal intelligence). Ultimately, AI would know exactly what it
is aiming at.4. The future calls for working together
As happens in any scientific discipline, any extension over
the objects and phenomena of interest leads to further re-
search opportunities and discoveries, but also raises the risk
of some parts of the established paradigm being refuted or
revised for the more general situation. Universal tests are
not only strictly necessary for machine evaluation, but they
can also be a very important research tool for detecting in-
consistencies and for the generalisation of scales and
procedures.
The common use of CAPTCHAs in a wide range of situa-
tions is an indicator that things will become more complex
in the future. An astonishing plethora of bots, avatars, ani-
mats, swarms and other kinds of virtual agents will require
a thoughtfully-designed battery of tests. Many of these tests
will have to be universal, especially when no information
about the subject is given beforehand (not even information
of whether it is a human or a machine). Universal tests will
become even more imperative when machines get close to
and ultimately beyond human intelligence (Hernández-
Orallo & Dowe, 2010; Solomonoff, 1985).
But how can these tests be constructed? We think they
must be based upon many of the techniques which have
been developed for intelligence measurement in psychomet-
rics, comparative psychology, animal cognition, information
theory and AI. The study of this possibility is the very goal
of the project “Anytime Universal Intelligence” (http://
users.dsic.upv.es/proy/anynt/). One of the outcomes of this
project has been a mathematical setting for constructing uni-
versal tests—built upon solid, non-anthropomorphic founda-
tions (Hernández-Orallo & Dowe, 2010). Naturally, there are
also many difficulties along the way—as some preliminary
tests on machines and humans are showing (Hernández-
Orallo, Dowe, España-Cubillo, Hernández-Lloreda, & Insa-
Cabrera, 2011; Insa-Cabrera, Dowe, España-Cubillo, Hernández-
Lloreda & Hernández-Orallo, 2011; Insa-Cabrera, Dowe &
Hernandez-Orallo, 2011). For example, some simple “a priori
algorithms”—the terminology used by Detterman for the
second level of the challenge—can score better than humans
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set of tasks.
One natural consequence of aiming at universality is that
tests need to be adaptive to an unknown subject of unexpected
characteristics, and the complexity of itemsmust be determined
in advance in order to use them on demand, as tests do in the
area of computerised adaptive testing. Many other notions
from psychometrics and (comparative) psychology also apply,
such as the notions of a task being discriminative, the use of re-
wards and, of course, the use of (latent) factor analysis andother
statistical tools for experimental results. In the end, most of the
knowledge and techniques in the science of human intelligence
are directly applicable. Yet, as we point out in this paper, only a
few concepts and techniques (would) need to be re-considered
or revised. Ultimately, humans are a perfect source for refutation
of tests for machines and vice versa.
What seems clear to us is that a new generation of intelli-
gence tests for machines will require an enormous effort. This
will most likely involve several decades and a myriad of re-
searchers from many disciplines. But the quest is so fascinat-
ing that it is already growing in popularity (Biever, 2011;
Kleiner, 2011). We share Detterman's “hope” that “it may
someday happen […] that the fields of artificial and human
intelligence will grow closer together, each learning from
the other” (Detterman, 2011). We have been stirring up this
hope for over fifteen years. Everyone is welcome on board.
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